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TAX AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES
TO THE MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE
FINANCING CRISIS: A BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS APPROACH
Diane Lourdes Dick*
INTRODUCTION
The United States faces an unparalleled healthcare financing crisis.'
In 2006, more than fifty-five million individuals in need of healthcare
coverage turned to the federal and state governments for assistance
through the Medicaid program.2 Among those seeking coverage are
low-income pregnant women and families with dependent children; the
aged, blind, and disabled; the mentally ill; and acutely or chronically ill
persons who lack private insurance coverage.'
Meeting the health insurance needs of these categorically 4 and
medically5 needy Americans through a public welfare program is no easy
* J.D., 2005, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.A. in Political Science, 1999,
Florida International University. I owe a debt of gratitude to Patricia Dilley, Jeffrey Harrison,
David Richardson and Danaya Wright for their attentive assistance and detailed comments on
earlier drafts, and to Suzanne Hutton for mentoring me through complex legal questions in the
area of assisted living. I am also grateful for the comments and guidance of Professor Barak
Richman of Duke Law School. His recent article Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Under-
standing Medicaid's Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 705 (2005), served as both an inspiration and
an example for my work. Perhaps more fundamentally, however, I thank the residents, families,
and healthcare professionals I came to know when I worked in long-term care social services
prior to law school. Their stories, insights, and thoughtful reflections motivated my research and
enabled me to synthesize a wide range of interdisciplinary findings. I dedicate this Article to the
memory of Mack Lomrance, whose dignity and grace continue to inspire me.
1 Even a cursory glance at recent newspaper headlines nationwide reveals the extent of the
problem. See, e.g., Robert Pear, States are Facing Big Fiscal Crises, Governors Report, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2002, at Al; Governors Fret Over Medicaid Meeting With Bush, They Fear States Will Go
Broke if They Must Carry Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2005, at A8.
2 Figures are for fiscal year 2006. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRESIDENT'S
FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2004).
3 See sources cited infra notes 17-20.
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C), 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (2000). Medicaid
was developed to provide healthcare coverage for the "categorically needy," or those that cur-
rently receive financial assistance from means-tested federal programs. See also 42 C.F.R.
435.100-.135, .700-735 (2004).
5 "Medically needy" individuals do not meet the income requirements for other public
assistance programs, but have healthcare needs that cost far more than they are able to pay. 42
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task. Healthcare costs steadily rise,6 and income tax revenues have only
recently begun to recover from the post-September 11 recession. 7 In
2003, the total federal and state outlay for Medicaid was $273 billion;8
this figure is expected to have exceeded $300 billion in 2006.9 On aver-
age, Medicaid expenditures already consume approximately 20 percent
of state general funds,'" while the federal share of costs will rise to ap-
proximately $199 billion in 2007.11 Although these amounts may seem
miniscule compared to other government expenditures, some analysts
predict that the combined costs of Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Se-
curity could consume more than a quarter of the gross domestic product
by the year 2050.12
Pressing against this broader budgetary quagmire, the nation's per-
sistent reliance on Medicaid to finance long-term care for the elderly has
become one of the most imperative dilemmas facing policy-makers to-
day. 13 Medicaid was created in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Se-
C.F.R. § 435.300-.350, .800-.852 (2004); see also Mass. Ass'n of Older Americans v. Sharp, 700
F.2d 749, 750 (1st Cir. 1983) (describing the medically needy classification).
6 The mounting costs of healthcare are a significant burden on states, many of which are
constitutionally bound to avoid budgetary deficits. See, e.g., Editorial: Only Feds Can Cure What
Aill Medicaid, Georgia's Efforts Can Alleviare Only The Symptoms, Not the Cause of Skyrocketing
Healthcare, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 27, 2005, at E6.
7 In fact, shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Association of
State Budget Officers reported widespread state budgetary shortfalls for Medicaid payments,
totaling approximately $15 billion. Press Release, Nat'l Governors Assoc., Governors Seek In-
crease in Federal Share for Medicaid (November 7, 2001), available at http://www.vor.net/nov-
12-01.htm.
8 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 2003 DATA COMPENDIUM 5 (2003) (providing benefit outlays by program).
9 Medicaid Spending Growth and Options for Controlling Costs: Hearing Before the S. Special
Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Donald B. Marron, Acting Director,
Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/73xx/doc7387/07-13-
Medicaid.pdf.
10 Susan M. Pettey, State Budget Crises Endanger Medicaid Long-Term Care Services, CARING
FOR THE AGES, Jan. 2002, at 9, reprinted at http://www.amda.com/publications/caring/january
2002/statebudget.cfm.
11 ROBIN RUDOWITZ & MOLLY O'MALLEY, THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE PRESIDENT'S FY 2007
BUDGET PROPOSAL: OVERVIEW AND BRIEFING CHARTS 13 (2007), available at http://
www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7472.pdf.
12 Eric M. Patashnik, Book Review, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1235, 1235 (2004)
(reviewing STUART H. ALTMAN & DAVID I. SHACTMAN, POLICIES FOR AN AGING SOCIETY
(2002)).
13 One author accurately described Medicaid as "America's de facto long-term care pro-
gram." See id. Medicaid coverage for the elderly, and particularly for those in need of long-term
care services, is the fastest growing segment of the total program costs. See THE KAISER
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curity Act 14 as a federal and state partnership. 5  The program was
originally designed to provide healthcare coverage for low-income fami-
lies who meet eligibility requirements for the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children program. 16 More recently, the Medicaid program has
been expanded to include a wider range of families; 17 pregnant wo-
men; 18 the aged, blind, and disabled;' 9 and acutely or chronically ill
individuals who lack private healthcare insurance.20 Medicaid has also
become the nation's primary payer source for long-term care.2 Since
long-term care services are beyond the scope of Medicare and most pri-
vate healthcare insurance programs, 22 Americans in need of long-term
care come within the "medically needy" classification: they are entitled
to receive Medicaid benefits if they cannot pay privately.
To be sure, most Americans are unable to finance long-term care
without governmental assistance and must turn to Medicaid when the
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
MEDICAID: FIscAL CHALLENGES TO COVERAGE 2 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/medi-
caid/upload/Medicaid-Fiscal-Challenges-to-Coverage.pdf.
14 Pub. L. No. 89-97, 121-22, 79 Stat. 370 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-
1396s (2004) and 42 C.F.R. § 430-56 (2004)).
15 The federal and state governments fund Medicaid. The program is administered at the
state level, though many aspects are authorized or mandated by federal law. See Shawn Patrick
Regan, Note, Medicaid Estate Planning: Congress' Ersatz Solution for Long- Term Health Care, 44
CATH. U. L. REV. 1217, 1217-18 (1995).
16 See Catherine Hoffman, Diane Rowland, & Alicia L. Carbaugh, Holes in the Health Insur-
ance System: Who Lacks Coverage and Why, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 392-93 (2004) (dis-
cussing Medicaid's origins in Depression-era welfare goals).
17 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, Title IV, § 4901(a), 111 Stat. 552
(1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (2000)) (establishing the State Children's Health Insur-
ance Program, which expanded Medicaid benefits for low-income families with children).
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III), 1396d(n)(1) (2000) (providing Medicaid cover-
age for pregnant women who would be eligible to receive public assistance once the child is
born); § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(III) (providing Medicaid coverage for pregnant women with in-
come below 133% of the federal poverty line).
19 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II), (0; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.120, 435.121
(2004).
20 For instance, according to one report: "Medicaid is the largest source of federal spending
for HIV/AIDS care in the United States. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) estimates that FY 2006 federal Medicaid spending on HIV/AIDS will total $6.3 billion,
or half of all federal spending on HIVIAIDS care .... JENNIFER KATES, KAISER FAMILY FOUN-
DATION, HIV/AIDS POLICY FACT SHEET 1 (2006).
21 See infra note 32.
22 See source cited supra note 9, at 6.
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need arises.23 A number of trends converge to create this heavy reliance
on public assistance. Many seniors do not have private long-term care
insurance 24 and most lack sufficient financial resources to pay the high
cost of long-term care. 5 Meanwhile, many others simply ignore the
need to plan for long-term care expenses, and enroll in Medicaid once
the need arises. 6
Since Medicaid is a means-tested program, beneficiaries must meet
specific asset and income criteria.27 Applicants with some savings will
be required to "spend down" assets on long-term care services. 8 Medi-
caid will assume the cost of long-term care only after the applicant has
exhausted most personal sources of funding. 29 Applicants are permitted
to retain the principal residence and other exempted assets; however,
these assets can be seized by the state upon the beneficiary's death, up to
the value of benefits received.30 To avoid the consequences of these pro-
visions, many Americans engage in "voluntary impoverishment" by
making inter vivos gifts of property to meet Medicaid's asset and income
qualifications.31
23 See Diane Lourdes Dick, The Impact of Medicaid Estate Recovery on Nontraditional Farni-
lies, 153 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 525, 531-34 (2004) (discussing the growing reliance on
Medicaid to finance long-term care).
24 Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance:
Medicaid and the Long- Term Care Insurance Market 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10989, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10989.pdf (noting that
"[p]rivate insurance reimburses only 4 percent of long-term care expenditures.").
25 Personal or familial assets support only 38 percent of all nursing home residents. See
Retirement Survey Shows Vast Majority of Baby Boomers Have Misperceptions About Paying for
Long-Term Care, Bus. WiRE, June 1, 1999, at 2, available at LEXIS.
26 See source cited infra note 67.
27 See sources cited infra notes 28 and 29.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 139 6 p (2000) (codifying Medicaid spend down provisions).
29 The principal residence is excluded from the applicant's assets upon initial application. See
id. To reduce fraud, federal law directs state officials to determine whether assets have been
transferred or divested by the applicant within a certain "lookback period" of either thirty-six or
sixty months, depending on the nature of the transfer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A), (B). Any
transfers of assets for less than fair market value within the lookback period will result in a
penalty calculation. The applicant will be deemed ineligible for Medicaid benefits until he pri-
vately pays for long-term care services in an amount equal to the value of the assets transferred.
Id.
30 See infra, Part II, discussing Medicaid estate recovery programs.
31 See John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 81 (2003).
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While statistics vary by state, almost two-thirds of all nursing home
residents nationwide receive Medicaid benefits? 2 Elderly persons in
need of long-term care services comprise a significant portion of Medi-
caid's total program beneficiaries. In 2004, approximately 35 percent of
total Medicaid dollars were used to support long-term care for the eld-
erly.3 3 If the Medicaid program remains the primary payer source for
long-term care, then the percentage of total Medicaid dollars spent on
long-term care for the elderly will likely increase significantly over time.
Not only are long-term care costs expected to rise,34 but the number of
elderly beneficiaries will likely increase as well-particularly as the baby
boomers enter old age.35
In response to this fiscal predicament, policy-makers have identi-
fied a need to alleviate the burden of long-term care costs by encourag-
ing those with sufficient financial resources to look beyond the
Medicaid program for long-term care financing.36 The federal and state
governments have developed tax and economic policies to discourage
reliance on Medicaid and encourage reliance on private resources.
These incentives, which are discussed in detail in subsequent sections,
include federal and state income tax deductions for the cost of long-
term care insurance, Medicaid partnership programs to encourage the
use of private insurance to pay for the minimum duration of care, and
federal and state tax incentives for families that provide in-home care to
loved ones. 37 These initiatives appear to be producing the desired short-
term behavioral outcome: increasing numbers of Americans are purchas-
32 See, e.g., Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a Practi-
cal Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery, 5 ELDER L.J. 359 (1997) (explaining that Medicaid
pays the costs of 60 percent of all nursing home bed days nationwide).
33 See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 1 Fig.5 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235.pdf.
34 The cost of long-term care rises by 8 percent each year. See Paul Palazzo, Can You Afford
To Grow Old? - Lack Of Planning For Long- Term Care Could Add Fiscal Ruin To Poor Health,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at D1.
35 Long Term Care: Aging Baby Boom Generation Will Increase Demand and Burden on Federal
and State Budgets: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 1 (2002) [herein-
after Hearing on Baby Boom Generation] (statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of
the United States), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02544t.pdf.
36 On the political debate surrounding the Medicaid and Medicare financing crises, see
DAVID G. SMITH, ENTITLEMENT POLITICS: MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, 1995-2001 (2002).
37 See infra Part II.
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ing long-term care insurance, 38 and in-home care remains a viable op-
tion within many families.3 9
However, although these indicators suggest that consumers are re-
sponding to tax and economic incentives, it is not necessarily clear that
these responses will provide a durable or even adequate solution to the
more imperative Medicaid financing crisis. In fact, the underlying ex-
pectations of policy-makers may be flawed. Policy-makers seem to ex-
pect that private long-term care insurance policies purchased today will
ultimately assume the insured's lifelong risk of long-term care expenses,
thereby removing the need to seek Medicaid benefits for such care.4°
This expectation requires that consumers purchase a policy, and then
maintain that policy until long-term care needs arise. To achieve these
ends without implementing a compulsory program, policy-makers must
substantially modify consumer behavior-not simply in terms of their
short-term immediate responses to financial planning incentives, but
also in terms of their long-term, attitudinal reactions to the realities of
aging and other more personal aspects of long-term care decision-mak-
ing. The following sections reveal that the emergent behavioral eco-
nomics model offers a more comprehensive model of aggregate
consumer behavior,"1 and would enable policy-makers to develop a dy-
38 See Robert Clofine & Gregory L. Kiersz, Evaluating Long- Term Care Insurance Options, 74
PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 147, 147 (2003) (citing THE HEALTH INS. Assoc. OF AMERICA, LONG-
TERM CARE INSURANCE IN 2000-2001, RESEARCH FINDINGS, (2003)) ("The total number of
[insurance] policies sold has grown from 815,000 in 1987 to nearly 8.3 million in 2001.").
39 See BARBARA COLEMAN, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, FACT SHEET: FAMILY
CAREGIVING AND LONG-TERM CARE 1 (2002), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/
fs9ljtc.pdf (estimating that 80 percent of long-term care services are provided by family
caregivers and that the value of this family caregiving has been estimated at $196 billion in
1997).
40 See infra Part III.
41 See infra Part I.B-C. Recently, legal scholars have used behavioral economics to scrutinize
the broader healthcare financing quagmire. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics
and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid's Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 705 (2005) (using a
behavioral economics model to understand why Medicaid, as a public health insurance program,
has failed to improve the overall health status of program beneficiaries). Richman explains that
despite the growing use of this methodology, a dearth of literature remains. "[Alcademic efforts
that use psychosocial data to inform, and perhaps radically alter, the rational actor model are
virtually nonexistent." Id. at 723 n.63 (citing Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and
Health Economics (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 10881, 2004), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10881.pdf) ("[Tihe application of behavioral economics to is-
sues in health economics have been largely confined to understanding addictive behavior around
cigarettes, drugs, and alcohol.").
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namic picture of the short-term and long-term concerns that arise in
this unique consumer market.
The behavioral economics model acknowledges certain unique
preferences that motivate rational actors in the long-term care market.
First, empirical evidence reveals that a deep discomfort at the thought of
growing old causes many consumers to avoid the entire notion of long-
term care planning.42 Second, empirical observations suggest that most
Americans prefer informal, in-home care over professional or institu-
tional care; in fact, many believe that loved ones would decline to offer
such care if a long-term care insurance policy was available to support
institutional care.43 Finally, studies reveal that a significant number of
consumers grossly underestimate their own future need for long-term
care.
44
Beyond these preferences, empirical evidence also reveals that vari-
ous motivations influence consumers differently depending on how
close they are to old age. For instance, if long-term care planning pri-
marily provides future utility maximization, then the likelihood of tak-
ing such steps will vary based upon how each consumer weighs the
future benefits of long-term care.45 Indeed, since the benefit of a sound
long-term care financial plan would likely materialize when the con-
sumer is elderly and perhaps incapacitated, planning will only provide
utility maximization if the consumer accepts that this potentially inca-
pacitated person is a future self, worthy of present-day sacrifices. 46 If,
instead, the consumer chooses to deny the likelihood of becoming inca-
pacitated, or if the consumer believes that the conscious "self' would
cease to exist if and when the incapacitation occurs, then the benefits of
planning would seem negligible.
These insights suggest that policy-makers should not unduly rely
on today's statistics that show ever-increasing numbers of new long-term
care insurance policies.47 Even if governmental incentives successfully
motivate large numbers of consumers to engage in present-day planning
for future long-term care needs, the incentives may in fact only reach
consumers who were already predisposed to plan. Furthermore, even
these momentary steps toward planning could unravel as evolving emo-
42 See infia notes 103-105.
43 See infra Part I.C.l.iii.
44 See infra Part I.C.I.ii.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See supra note 38.
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tional motivations entice consumers to re-evaluate their initial planning
decisions in unexpected ways. Specifically, as behavioral motivations
become more pronounced, insured individuals may terminate the policy
("lapse") before long-term care needs arise.48 Thus, even where initial
policy purchases are based on financial considerations, the potential for
lapses will increase over time as a particular age cohort begins to factor
emotional and behavioral motivations. Each time a lapse occurs, the
long-term benefits of a consumer's initial steps toward planning are
erased: the federal and state governments may once again have to pro-
vide Medicaid benefits if long-term care needs arise and the individual
lacks the ability to pay. Indeed, backpedaling of this sort appears to be
taking place among insured persons. According to one report, consum-
ers deliberately drop approximately 7 percent. of in-force policies each
year.
Consequently, although current initiatives appear to have some
limited applications, they are not likely to resolve the broader long-term
care financing dilemma. Additional programs or incentives are neces-
sary to resolve the Medicaid long-term care financing crisis, and such
programs should be tailored to address behavioral tendencies. By devel-
oping a dynamic theoretical framework that captures the nuances of
long-term care consumer behavior, policy-makers can make more in-
formed decisions about whether and how to restructure our system of
long-term care financing.5 °
This Article contributes to this dialogue by analyzing policy solu-
tions to the Medicaid crisis against the backdrop of consumer choice
theory. To this end, Part I introduces traditional rational choice theory
and the emergent behavioral economics model, and identifies specific
preferences and time functions that affect consumer behavior in the
long-term care planning market. Part II describes federal and state tax
and economic policy responses to the long-term care financing crisis,
48 See infra Parts III-IV. Although I've confined my analysis to the potential for insured-
initiated lapses in long-term care insurance policies, the potential for insurer-initiated lapses or
reductions in benefits should be explored further in subsequent works. A recent article provides
some evidence that insurer-initiated lapses are likely. See Andrea Coombes, Insurers Struggle With
Long-Term Care, WAIL ST. J., June 15, 2005, at Ai.
49 See source cited infra note 179.
50 Leading scholars in the field of aging and policy studies cite the need for additional re-
search to assist policymakers in their efforts to refine public and private financing for long-term
care. See, e.g., FRANCIS CARO, ACADEMY HEALTH, LONG-TERM CARE: INFORMED By RE-
SEARCH (2003), www.academyhealth.org/publications/ltcresearch.pdf.
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which are primarily designed to discourage individual reliance on public
assistance for long-term care, while simultaneously encouraging the
purchase of long-term care insurance. Part III describes the legislative
intent behind these initiatives, and finds that the desired "pay out" of
long-term care insurance is one that is highly susceptible to intervening
events-namely, that the insured might allow the policy to lapse. To
assess the potential for consumer-initiated lapses, Part IV uses the in-
sights from behavioral economics to model aggregate consumer behav-
ior. Concluding that current regulatory initiatives cannot guarantee
continued reliance on private financing for long-term care, Part V rec-
ommends that that federal and state governments work together to de-
velop a universal compulsory program, so that consumers are obligated
to make a relatively small present-day sacrifice to provide benefits for the
future incapacitated self. In the course of developing and conceptualiz-
ing a solution of this sort through a behavioral economics framework,
this work contributes to the broader theoretical understanding of how
and when economic policies-and particularly modifications to the in-
come tax system-can be used to shape consumer behavior.
I. LONG-TERM CARE FINANCIAL PLANNING THROUGH A
CONSUMER CHOICE LENS
By recognizing and understanding the particularly complex deci-
sions consumers make in the area of long-term care planning, policy-
makers can more effectively achieve, and sustain, the desired decrease in
public reliance on Medicaid. The following sections provide an over-
view of two social science models of consumer behavior: the traditional
economics model of rational choice, and the emergent behavioral eco-
nomics model.
A. The Traditional Model of Rational Consumer Choice
The traditional economics model of rational choice assumes, first
and foremost, that individuals are self-interested and seek to maximize
their expected utility when presented with an opportunity to make a
choice. 5' Individuals increase overall utility when they advance finan-
51 See JAMES COLEMAN, THE MATHEMATICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1973); ANTHONY
HEATH, RATIONAL CHOICE AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE (1976); see also Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
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cial, social, physical, emotional, or other interests.5 2 The fundamental
desire to maximize utility causes rational actors to identify specific "pref-
erences" whenever they are confronted with a choice.5 3 These prefer-
ences are then used to calculate costs and benefits of each alternative.54
To be considered a rational choice, the choice should be "com-
plete," meaning that the individual was fully aware of the alternatives,
and "transitive," meaning that the individual would consistently seek to
advance the same preferences.55 However, economists concede that
sometimes consumers must make choices with incomplete informa-
tion;56 in these settings of uncertainty, the rational actor should calcu-
late the probability of certain outcomes based on available
information. 57
At first glance, the tremendous cost of long-term care, combined
with a regulatory scheme that encourages reliance on private funding
sources, should lead the rational consumer with sufficient resources to
develop and maintain an economically sound financial plan for long-
term care. 58 Yet the fact remains that although the trend may be chang-
52 The fundamental assumption of humans as self-interested is rooted in Hobbesian philoso-
phy, and forms the backbone of rational choice theory. See, e.g., CARL FRIEDRICH, MAN AND
His GOVERNMENT 159 (1963) (describing the role of Hobbesian theory in developing a rational
model of political actors).
53 Theorists differ in how they believe the rational actor weighs and ranks various alterna-
tives to make a choice. See, e.g., ANATOL RAPPORT, Two-PERSON GAME THEORY: THE ESSEN-
TiL IDEAS (1966) (discussing the manner by which rational actors rank preferences and
outcomes).
54 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51, at 1060-64.
55 AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 16 (1970).
56 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Modelfor Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955);
see also HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). An important subfield of rational choice
theory considers how individuals make choices in the often hectic, modern world. See, e.g., 3
HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1997). Herbert Simon developed a
theory of "bounded rationality": he theorized that although humans strive to make utility-ad-
vancing choices, they are fundamentally limited in their ability and willingness to collect and
weigh all relevant information. Id. Accordingly, individuals will often fall significantly short of
perfectly efficient processing, and instead perform whatever degree of processing that they be-
lieve to be "good enough." See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The
Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. Soc. 548 (1981) (summarizing bounded rationality as an
important development in the field of economics).
57 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46-48 (4th ed. 2000).
The consumer's ultimate choice would also depend on his individual preference for risk. Id. A
consumer can be risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-preferring. Id.
58 See infra Part II.
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ing,59 most consumers do not have a financial plan in place.6" Consum-
ers who decline to develop an affirmative plan may be left with no other
choice but to spend down assets, enroll in Medicaid, and relinquish the
right to devise the principal residence upon death.61
Although these outcomes clearly frustrate policy-makers, the
choices that lead to them are not necessarily irrational. Below the sur-
face, these typical long-term care consumer choices may in fact satisfy
the traditional economics model's basic assumption of utility maximiza-
tion.6 2 For instance, these choices might be explained by more accu-
rately defining the nature of the decision faced by consumers, by
evaluating the amount and quality of information available, or by study-
ing the possible utility derived by advancing emotional and behavioral
motivations. The emergent behavioral economics model expands the
scope of traditional rational choice theory by identifying the mul-
tifaceted decision-making processes of psychologically complex, emo-
tionally-motivated beings. As the following sections reveal, the
behavioral model may be better suited to explain consumer decision-
making in the long-term care financial planning arena.
B. The Behavioral Economics Model of Consumer Choice
The behavioral economics model of consumer choice provides
more depth to the traditional model's recognition that rational actors
seek to advance overall utility.63 This theoretical framework identifies
less obvious forms of utility, which are derived from emotional, psycho-
logical, social, and intellectual factors.64
59 A 2002 report noted that "[b]etween 1995 and 2002, the number of long-term care
insurance policies grew by at least 10 percent or 500,000 new policies each year." SUSAN CoRO-
NEL, AMERICA'S HEALTH INS. PLANS (AHIP), RESEARCH FINDINGS, LONG-TERM CARE INSUR-
ANCE IN 2002, at 13 (2004), available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/18_LTC2002.pdf.
60 See sources cited supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
61 See infra Part II.A (discussing Medicaid estate recovery laws).
62 Economists argue that these choices are rational because they reflect the consumer's deci-
sion to rely on free Medicaid benefits rather than pay for private insurance. See, e.g., Brown &
Finkelstein, supra note 24, at 1.
63 For an overview of the behavioral economics model, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also Russell Korobkin, A "Traditional" and "Behav-
ioral" Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walter-Thomas Furniture Company (UCLA
Sch. of L., L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-24) (analyzing a legal
quagmire from the perspectives of traditional rational choice theory and behavioral economics
legal theory), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471961.
64 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 63.
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The behavioral economics model is essentially a reflection of the
insights gained from early works of B.F. Skinner, in which he posited
that humans are often driven by positive or negative reinforcements, and
can be profoundly motivated by emotional needs.65 When behavioral
psychologists build on this foundation to explain more subtle nuances of
human decision-making, they supplement and bolster the traditional ec-
onomics model's ability to explain and predict even the most complex
choices. Thus, the behavioral economics model supplements the ra-
tional choice paradigm with additional insights from fields such as
heuristics, 66 sociology, and psychology, so that theorists can better un-
derstand why rational actors can systematically arrive at seemingly irra-
tional decisions.
C. Long-Term Care Planning under the Behavioral Economics Model
Under the behavioral economics model of rational choice, even the
most baffling trends can be understood as rational choices. The follow-
ing subsections highlight some of the most common motivations that
emerge when consumers consider long-term care needs.
1. Unique Preferences in Long-Term Care Planning
Since long-term care generally foreshadows, or at least implicates,
the end of one's life, individuals must necessarily grapple with certain
emotional and behavioral responses. For a large portion of consumers,
emotional preferences that arise when the consumer thinks about long-
term care are the primary forces behind planning decisions. These
deeply rooted preferences are discussed in the following sections.
i. Preference 1: Diminished Utility at the Mere Thought of Long-Term
Care Needs
Although infinitely frustrating to policy-makers, the choice to
avoid consideration of long-term care planning may very well be a ra-
tional one. Aging is not a favored topic of discourse; planning is often
65 See generally B.F. SKINNER, THE BEHAVIOUR OF ORGANISMS (1938); B.F. SKINNER, SCI-
ENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOUR (1953).
66 Heuristics is the study of human decision-making. For a general description of this body
of research as it is typically applied in the social sciences, see, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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begun only when medical needs foreshadow long-term care placement.67
Because many individuals do not wish to think about the prospect of
growing old, any reflection on the subject of aging will most likely re-
duce emotional well-being and diminish overall utility. As a result, the
rational actor may choose to avoid initial deliberation, and then ignore
all subsequent information.
This preference may appear to be irrational in that it leads consum-
ers to patently reject even the most advantageous planning options.
However, behavioralists observe that in addition to being "bounded" by
fundamental limitations on the human mind's ability to gather and eval-
uate evidence, 68 rational actors sometimes choose to willingly limit in-
formation intake before making a decision. In this manner, rational
actors engage in what Herbert Simon has termed "satisficing" and
choose to make a decision that will be "good enough. ' 69 Where a con-
sumer decides to "satisfice" in his initial choice-as with the option to
engage or not engage in financial planning-he in essence decides to
forego the option to make rational choices about specific planning
options.
ii. Preference 2: Maximized Utility by Underestimating One's Future
Need for Long-term Care
Even among consumers who choose to think about long-term care,
related motivations may lead some people that consider it to decide that
planning is unnecessary. Rational actors make decisions with a human
mind, and they are susceptible to certain biological and psychological
tendencies. 70 Humans make choices based upon systematic and perva-
sive biases, which in turn affect the way that they perceive alternatives.71
For instance, some of the earliest behavioral works observe that decision-
makers often exercise "overconfidence," whereby they underestimate the
67 One author explains, "Too often it is only when a family member becomes disabled that
they learn that these expenses will have to be paid for out-of-pocket . . . . [I] ndividuals whose
long-term care needs arise as a result of a sudden onset of a stroke or other illness do not have
adequate time to plan." Janel C. Frank, How Far Is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid Estate
Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 116 n.47 (2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 106-229(I), at 153
(2000)).
68 Bounded rationality is discussed supra, note 56.
69 For a discussion of "satisficing," particularly as it relates to organizational behavior, see
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN, supra note 36, at 204. See also JAMES MARCH AND HERBERT SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS 190 (1958).
70 Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, supra note 56, at 101.
71 See, e.g., COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY (2003).
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likelihood that unfortunate things might occur in their own lives and
use subjective rather than objective factors to weigh risk.72 As a result of
this highly personal, skewed evaluation, the rational actor may at times
make choices that deviate substantially from the clearly logical choice. 73
In the arena of long-term care decision-making, many individuals
grossly underestimate their own potential need for long-term care, even
in the face of overwhelming contrary statistics. For example, an insur-
ance industry report found that among individuals age fifty-five and
over, "less than one in three believe they have a greater than 50 percent
chance of needing nursing home care ... in the future, even though the
lifetime risk of needing such care is 43 percent."74  Overconfidence is
perhaps more likely among younger age cohorts: a recent poll of Massa-
chusetts residents found that 41 percent of persons under the age of
twenty-five do not anticipate any need for long-term care services in
their lifetimes. 75 However, even among older age cohorts, the overcon-
fidence heuristic can still figure prominently. A study conducted among
AARP members in the state of New York found that almost one-tenth
of respondents over the age of fifty do not believe they will ever need
long-term care.76
72 Korobkin & Uen, supra note 51, at 1086. In a highly influential work, psychologists
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman developed "prospect theory" to describe the manner by
which rational actors assess risks and benefits in ways that may differ from the actual, objective
truth. See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Repre-
sentation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
73 One theorist explains:
Prospect theory also differs from expected utility theory in the way it handles the
probabilities attached to particular outcomes. Classical utility theory assumes that
decision makers value a 50 percent chance of winning as exactly that: a 50 percent
chance of winning. In contrast, prospect theory treats preferences as a function of
"decision weights," and it assumes that these weights do not always correspond to
probabilities. Specifically, prospect theory postulates that decision weights tend to
overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities.
SCOTT PLOus, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 98 (1993).
74 LIFEPLANS, INC., HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AMERICA, WHO Buys LONG-TERM CARE IN-
SURANCE IN 2000? A DECADE OF STUDY OF BUYERS AND NONBUYERS 21 (2000), available at
http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/17-WhoBuysLTCI2000.pdf.
75 Francis G. Caro, Elders in Massachusetts Prefer Paid Caregivers 1 (Gerontology Inst., Univ.
of Mass. Boston, 2002), available at http://www.geront.umb.edu/instWorkingPapers/
PaidLTCrev.pdf.
76 When asked why they do not own long-term care insurance, 9 percent of respondents said
they "Don't think [I] will need long-term care." KATHERINE BRIDGES, AARP, LONG-TERM
CARE: A SURVEY OF NEW YORK AARP MEMBERS 2 (2004), available at http://assets.aarp.org/
rgcenter/health/ny-ltc.pdf.
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iii. Preference 3: Diminished Utility at the Thought of Institutional
Care; Maximized Utility at the Thought of Informal Care
from Loved Ones
Rational actors are deeply biased by traditions and customs; these
biases can affect the values assigned to each option, and the manner in
which costs and benefits are weighed. 77 Empirical evidence reveals that
a majority of Americans strongly prefer in-home care provided by loved
ones; paid home-based or institutional care is generally considered to be
a less attractive option. 78 For some, this desire may be rooted in a sense
of nostalgia or a feeling of expectancy. 79 One possible explanation may
be that today's older Americans grew up in a time when the majority of
women remained in the home and tended to children, so that they were
also available to provide assistance to aging relatives.80 Caregivers appear
to be driven by the same deeply-rooted preferences. In fact, a 1995
qualitative study found that family caregiving is often provided based on
a "commitment to social standards of behavior and role fulfillment,
'natural' responses to crises, being the 'only one,' and a commitment to
family precedent."8
The behavioral model takes these findings even further by demon-
strating how certain preferences can become so entrenched that they can
ultimately influence decision-making more profoundly than more
ephemeral likes and dislikes.82 For instance, where a preference rises to
77 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51, at 1085. See also, e.g., Jonathan Bendor, Daniel
Diermeier & Michael Ting, A Behavioral Model of Turnout, 97 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 261 (2003)
(noting that "citizens may have a sense of duty to vote that outweighs the cost of participation").
78 A recent study surveyed adults about their preferences for future long-term care, finding
that the majority preferred in-home or community-based care, either by relatives or non-rela-
tives; few participants were amenable to nursing home care. J. Kevin Eckert et al., Preferences for
Receipt of Care Among Community-Dwelling Adults, 162 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 49 (2004).
Similarly, a 2004 AARP telephone survey of 1,006 AARP members residing in the state of New
York found that the majority (61 percent) of respondents preferred home-based care, with assis-
tance from family members. BRIDGES, supra note 76, at 60-61.
79 Emotional motivations to expect informal, in-home care are explored more fully in
WENDY LUSTBADER, COUNTING ON KINDNESS: THE DILEMMA OF DEPENDENCY (1994).
80 On the disproportionate burden women carry for providing long-term care to loved ones,
see NANCY R. Hoox'AN & JUDITH GoNYEI, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY CARE: POLI-
CIES FOR GENDER JUSTICE (1995).
81 KATHRYN B. McGREw, OHIO LONG-TERM CARE RESEARCH PROJECT, CAREGIVING
PATHS, PATTERNS, AND PERSPECTIVES 4 (1995), available at http://casnovl.cas.muohio.edu/
scripps/publications/SumCaregivingPaths.html.
82 For a discussion of the manner by which economic institutions contribute to the forma-
tion of deeply-rooted, all-consuming preferences that ultimately frame decision-making more
profoundly than exogenous preferences, see Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural
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the level of a custom or tradition, the rational actor may be prone to
overestimate the likelihood that informal, in-home care will be pro-
vided-even if the consumer should clearly recognize that family mem-
bers may not be able to provide such care.83 Perhaps demonstrating this
overconfidence, one nationwide survey revealed that 60 percent of em-
ployed persons in the general population believe that their long-term
care needs will be met by loved ones.8" However, while the majority of
long-term care services is provided by loved ones in the home,85 many
individuals will require institutional care when their needs become more
pronounced. Furthermore, few middle-aged persons can definitively de-
clare that loved ones will meet their long-term care needs, since many
variables can alter this expectation.
Finally, some studies suggest that although the majority of Ameri-
cans desire in-home care provided by loved ones, many do not actually
trust their children to provide it without practical or financial incen-
tives.86 As a result, some consumers perceive the advance purchase of
long-term care insurance as an impairment of the more desirable option,
Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75 (1998).
Similarly, a subfield of behavioral economics has evolved to study the influence of cultural vari-
ables on the formation of deeply-rooted preferences. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping
Peng, Valuing Cultural Differences in Behavioral Economics (April 28, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=899688.
83 Sometimes, individuals intend to rely on care from a loved one, only to find that their
anticipated caregiver has predeceased them. For instance, a poll of 461 Massachusetts residents,
conducted in 2002, found that over half of respondents expressed a preference for in-home care,
provided by a spouse. UNIV. OF MAss. LOWELL POLL, MAY 5-MAY 9, 2002, at 3, available at
http://www.uml.edu/umasspoll/previous/data/pdf/2002-May5-May9.pdf. However, as the fed-
eral government's long-term care insurance program's promotional literature explains, "one of
the most common long-term care scenarios is for wives to become the primary caregivers for
their husbands, only to find that they lack a source of care when their own long-term care needs
arise." Website of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Federal Long Term Care Insurance
Program, "Did You Know?" . . Long Term Care Facts, http://www.opm.gov/insure/ltc/snip-
pets.htm (last visited February 3, 2007).
84 LIFEPLANS, INC., supra note 75, at 27.
85 See infra Part II.B.1.
86 This argument was posited in Mark V. Pauly, The Rational Nonpurchase of Long-Term
Care Insurance, 98 J. POL. ECON. 153, 163 (1990). A subsequent article published by two
economists developed a statistical modeling of the "moral hazard" effect within the long-term
care insurance market; the authors confirmed that an individual choosing whether to purchase
long-term care insurance will often recognize that the presence of such an insurance policy will
reduce the likelihood that adult children will provide informal care within the home setting.
Peter Zweifel & Wolfram Struwe, Long-Term Care Insurance in a Two-Generation Model, 65 J.
RISK & INS. 13, 14 (1998).
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since adult children might be less inclined to provide in-home care if a
pre-financed alternative exists. 87
2. Unique Time Functions in Long-Term Care Planning
In addition to the preferences described above, the long-term care
planning market is unique in that consumers must make choices over an
extended period. This not only means that different consumers will
confront the initial planning decision at varying life stages, but also that
each consumer may revisit the initial plan at later points in life. Moreo-
ver, since long-term care planning implicates one's final years, these
preferences will be highly sensitive to the consumer's evolving attitudes
toward the prospect of aging. The following subsections describe three
unique time functions that can cause rational actors to process long-
term care choices in unexpected ways.
i. Time Function 1: Long-term Care Planning as an Initial Proxy for
Financial Interests, and as an Evolving Proxy for
Emotional Interests
Although rational actors assign values to alternatives using objec-
tive measures-such as pecuniary worth-these objective measures are
sometimes used as proxies for subjective values that the rational actor
finds even more desirable than the objective value.88 In the arena of
long-term care, the rational actor may initially perceive long-term care
planning as a proxy for financial interests. In fact, a recent nationwide
survey found that 57 percent of long-term care insurance policyholders
initially purchased their policies to advance financial motives.89
However, the initial focus on financial utility appears to be a mo-
mentary one, which is ultimately subsumed by much more deeply emo-
tional considerations. As consumers approach the threshold of old age,
long-term care planning is increasingly perceived as a means to obtain
comfort, security, and positive surroundings. Once planning becomes a
proxy for these emotional interests, the consumer may decide to aban-
87 See id.
88 One early behavioral work noted that the acquisition of wealth and money also represent
another motivation for most humans: social approval. See GEORGE HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHA-
VIOUR: ITS ELEMENTARY FoRMs (1961).
89 LIFEPLANS, INC., supra note 74, at 28. This figure represents the combined results for the
following three rationales: "Protect Assets/Leave an Estate," (31 percent), "Guarantee Af-
fordability," (14 percent), and "Protect Living Standards" (12 percent). Id.
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don the original plan if it is unlikely to advance these new subjective
proxies.
In light of this shifting focus, abandonment of one's financial plan
is entirely conceivable. In fact, a consumer might maximize his utility
by abandoning a long-term care plan if he develops a fear of institu-
tional care in response to widespread stories of neglect and abuse in
nursing homes, 90 or if he adopts the more common preference for in-
home care provided by loved ones. The latter preference evolution has
been identified in at least one empirical study: a poll conducted in New
York found that while younger respondents tended to include profes-
sionals among their desired long-term care providers, older respondents
were more likely to omit professional caregivers and favor care provided
only by loved ones. 91
ii. Time Function 2: The Tendency to Disproportionately Value Current
Costs and Benefits Over Future Costs and Benefits
Even within the subset of consumers that choose to make the ini-
tial planning decision based purely on objective measures, the overall
values assigned by actors do not always correspond with these objective
calculations. 92 For instance, although pecuniary interests are based on
objective measures, the costs and benefits one associates with monetary
transactions are often highly subjective: "[I]ndividuals do not consider
all money fungible and, instead, establish different 'mental accounts' for
different classes of goods and services. '"9 3  Individuals have different
"discount rates," and therefore assign different values to present and fu-
ture benefits. 94 Furthermore, rational actors do not have stable prefer-
90 See, e.g., Mary H. Hayes, 2003 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Health Care Law, 9
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 816, 820-21 (2003) ("[C]ases of elder abuse, nursing home neg-
lect, and violence against seniors [are] being publicized in the media on an increasingly regular
basis."); Lisa Nerenberg, Abuse in Nursing Homes, NAT'L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE NEWSLETrER
(Wash., D.C.), May 2002, available at http://www.elderabusecenter.org/default.cfmp=abuse
innursinghomes.cfm.
91 BRIDGES, supra note 76, at 2 (finding that "[y]ounger members are most likely to say they
would prefer to have long-term care provided at home, with help from family, friends, and
homecare professionals (55 percent [for ages fifty through sixty-four] vs. 40 percent [for ages
sixty-five and over])" while "older members more often than younger members say they would
prefer to receive this care at home, with help from just family and friends (19 percent [for ages
sixty-five and over] vs. 10 percent [for ages fifty through sixty-four])").
92 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51.
93 Id., at 1103.
94 See, e.g., George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME
59, 59-71 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
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ences because discount rates are usually higher for benefits that will arise
in the distant future. 5
When actors are asked to value future costs or benefits, they first
consider the statistical probability that various outcomes will occur in
their own lives, and continuously "'update' (adjust) this 'base rate' with
any available particularized information about a specific situation. 96
Specifically, the "representativeness heuristic," which leads rational ac-
tors to undervalue certain base rates and overestimate other correla-
tions, 97 is a fluid and ever-changing bias which can change significantly
over time-particularly as the consumer grows older and as emotional
considerations are increasingly implicated. For instance, a recent poll of
Massachusetts residents found that 41 percent of consumers under the
age of twenty-five believe they will not require long-term care services. 8
However, among those over sixty-five, only 4 percent expressed this be-
lief.99 Thus, the anticipated need for long-term care services is highly
susceptible to the representativeness heuristic. Consequently, the per-
ceived value of long-term care planning will change as the consumer
updates the statistical probability that he will require such services.
iii. Time Function 3: The Problem of the "Future Incapacitated Self' as
a 'Non-Self' or an "Impossible Self"
Behavioralists observe that unlike the traditional economist's
model of a single rational actor, each individual may in fact comprise
"multiple selves": a "forward-looking self that plans to invest... [and a]
present-oriented self that changes course and decides to spend."100 The
present-day self tends to use a paradigm to order preferences and value
alternatives that is unique to its time frame, while making decisions that
affect other "selves."' 0° Thus, for instance, the rational actor must often
95 See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text. Discount rates are also discussed in
Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VANDERBILT L. REv. 267 (1993).
96 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51, at 1085.
97 Id. at 1085-87.
98 Caro, supra note 75, at 1.
99 See id.
100 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51, at 1121.
101 Id. at 1123 n.286 (suggesting that "each individual may be viewed as a collection of
competing preference orderings," leading to "a collective action problem in aggregating the con-
temporaneous preferences of these multiple selves").
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find a way to force the present-oriented self to make sacrifices that are
likely to bring future benefits.
10 2
These findings are clearly relevant in the area of long-term care.
Some consumers may feel that any use of today's income to finance
something so far in the future would be unwise. Likewise, since long-
term care is provided at the end of life, often when mental and physical
capacity is significantly diminished, the present-oriented self may per-
ceive long-term care as something that would be provided to a distant,
future incapacitated self, or even a "non-self' or an "impossible self."
10 3
Some individuals will simply hope that the incapacitated self never ma-
terializes;"0 4 others will treat this self as a ghost or apparition which
should be willed away with positive thoughts.' 5 Still others will actively
resent this self, and reward the present-day self more in comparison to
the perceived disappointments that the incapacitated self will intro-
duce.10 6 Thus, for consumers who carry any of these inclinations, it
may seem absurd to make present-day sacrifices to support the needs of
the incapacitated self.
In summary, consumers who approach long-term care planning
must grapple with these unique preferences and time functions. The
102 Id.
103 This argument was eloquently developed in McGEw, supra note 81.
The failure or refusal to imagine a frail/impaired possible self with at least some degree
of specificity is functionally different from imagining an unwanted or feared self ....
[B]oth hoped-for and unwanted/feared selves guide behaviors and decisions. On the
other hand, unimagined, or impossible, frail/impaired selves obstruct a perception of
vulnerability. The effect of this is to render related behaviors and decisions irrelevant.
Id at 7.
McGrew's poignant remarks summarize findings from a comprehensive qualitative study, in
which participants expressed these tendencies quite clearly in response to interview questions.
Participant statements include: "This is something that I just never wanted to put my thoughts
on," and "I just kind of flush it out of my mind." Id. See also Pauly, supra note 86 (explaining
that there may never be adequate demand for long-term care insurance because some consumers
will probably perceive the main benefit of planning as an increase in the policyholder's testamen-
tary estate).
104 One survey participant explained, "I am trying not to think about it too much. I'm
hoping it won't [happen]. That's all." McGREw, supra note 103, at 8.
105 Another respondent in McGrew's study explained, "You just sort of hold your breath and,
you know, thinking if you don't recognize it, it will go away." Id. at 7.
106 Id. at 8. One survey respondent in McGrew's study explained, "(Elvery time I start to
think of it a little bit I start imagining myself being more decrepit than I am right now. . and I
avoided it." Id. Another explained, "I get tired of hearing about assisted living and this and that
and what to do in your old age. You know, I take it one day at a time. It's so important to live in
the now." Id.
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following sections discuss and evaluate whether, in light of these con-
sumer motivations, current tax and economic incentives are likely to
address the long-term care financing crisis.
II. TAx AND ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES TO THE
MEDICAID CRISIS
In response to the looming Medicaid fiscal crisis, lawmakers have
identified a critical need to replenish Medicaid coffers through sources
other than tax revenues, while also reducing the total number of pro-
gram beneficiaries. Current law manifests a two-pronged approach: the
federal and state governments seek to discourage reliance on public assis-
tance for long-term care through Medicaid estate recovery programs,
while simultaneously encouraging reliance on private resources-such as
long-term care insurance policies and informal home care. As the fol-
lowing sections reveal, although these government incentives do have
some limited application, they are unlikely to have a sufficient impact
on consumer behavior.
A. Government Initiatives to Discourage Reliance on Public Assistance
for Long-Term Care: Medicaid Estate Recovery Programs
Although Medicaid is a means-tested program and beneficiaries
cannot legally retain large amounts of wealth, spend down provisions do
permit applicants to keep their principal residence.107 Thus, one way to
help preserve the financial health of the Medicaid program is to recover
the principal residence-or any other assets-from decedent recipients,
up to the value of Medicaid long-term care benefits received.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA 93")108
amended the Social Security Act to mandate recovery of the value of
long-term care benefits from the estates of decedents who received
Medicaid benefits beyond the age of fifty-five. °9 OBRA 93 also autho-
rizes each state to define "estate" to include:
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2000) (codifying Medicaid spend down provisions).
108 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 139 6 p) (2004).
109 Id. at § 1396p(b)(1)(B). Section 1396a, which establishes the Medicaid portion of the
Social Security Act, conditions state receipt of funding on "compl[iance] with the provisions of
section 1917 [42 U.S.C. § 139 6 p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical
assistance correctly paid . . . transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." Id. at
§ 1396a(a)(18). In provisions specifically dealing with Medicaid estate recovery, the Act pro-
vides, in pertinent part, "In the case of an individual who was fifty-five years of age or older
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... any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign[ee] of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other
arrangement.' 10
Thus, OBRA 93 not only mandates estate recovery, but also signifi-
cantly expands the range of property from which states may recover
assets.
Today, while estate recovery programs are still being developed and
refined, the trend is toward more systematic enforcement."' Policy-
makers hope that estate recovery programs will discourage reliance on
Medicaid by middle-class persons who have the means to procure long-
term care insurance." 2  However, this goal assumes that consumers
make a deliberate choice to rely on Medicaid, when in fact the behav-
ioral model suggests that a significant number of consumers arrive un-
wittingly on Medicaid rosters because they avoided planning altogether,
expected to receive in-home care from loved ones, or simply never be-
lieved they would require long-term care. 1 3 Thus, the impact of estate
recovery on initial consumer choice is likely to be minimal since many
consumers do not believe such programs will ever reach them.
Furthermore, estate recovery programs are unlikely to provide per-
fect replenishment for Medicaid coffers. Aside from the transaction
costs inherent in the recovery process, and apart from the continuously
rising costs of care, the simplest reason is that a large number of benefi-
ciaries will not leave behind recoverable assets. In recognition of this
reality, policy-makers have developed a second response to the Medicaid
crisis: government incentives that seek to encourage widespread reliance
on private support for long-term care.
when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery
from the individual's estate." Id. at § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
110 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
I1 See, e.g., Zieger, supra note 32, at 374-75.
112 See Belshe v. Hope, 33 Cal. App. 4th 161, 173, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasizing
that the California legislature's goals in enacting its Medicaid program are consistent with Con-
gress' goal of discouraging "non-poor elderly persons" from "using estate planning to avoid
applying their wealth to the costs of long-term care services for the purpose of having Medicaid
pay for their care").
113 See supra INTRODUCTION.
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B. Government Initiatives to Encourage Reliance on Private Payer
Sources for Long- Term Care
If mandatory estate recovery is intended, at least in part, to dis-
courage reliance on Medicaid for long-term care financing, then more
recent government initiatives may be viewed as the means by which pol-
icy-makers seek to make private funding sources appear more attrac-
tive.114 Specifically, federal and state laws establish tax expenditures"15
and other economic incentives to encourage families to provide infor-
mal, in-home care for loved ones and promote the purchase of long-
term care insurance policies. These measures are discussed below.
1. Additional Personal Exemption for Caregivers
Although discussion often focuses on the burgeoning costs of pro-
fessional care, lawmakers also recognize that a large portion of long-term
care is provided informally within families, without any direct cost to
the government." 6 Loved ones provide an estimated 80 percent of
long-term care, typically within the home. 1 7 A study released in 2002
found that approximately forty-five million Americans provide some
form of long-term care to friends or relatives." 8 The value of such care
was most recently estimated to be $196 billion in 1997;'' 9 given the rise
114 See, e.g., Karin C. Ottens, Note, Using Tax Incentives to Solve the Long-Term Care Crisis:
Ineffective and Inefficient, 22 VA. TAX REV. 747, 749 (2003).
115 The argument that a tax deduction is a governmental expenditure typically goes as fol-
lows: "'[tfax expenditures are revenue losses resulting from Federal tax provisions that grant
special tax relief designed to encourage certain kinds of behavior by taxpayers or to aid taxpayers
in special circumstances. These provisions may, in effect, be viewed as spending programs chan-
neled through the tax system."' Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The
Hidden Costs ofthe Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1347, 1353 n.25 (2000)
(quoting S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, (Comm. Print 1998)). For a more thor-
ough discussion, see STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
116 See Rosalie A. Kane & Joan D. Penrod, In Search of Family Caregiving Policy: General
Considerations, in FAMILY CAREGIVING IN AN AGING SOCIETY: POLICY PERSPECTIVES 2, 2 (Ros-
alie A. Kane & Joan D. Penrod eds., 1995) (discussing the prevalence of informal, in-home care
by family members).
117 COLEMAN, supra note 39, at 1.
118 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE WIDE CIRCLE OF GIVING: KEY FIND-
INGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY: LONG-TERM CARE FROM THE CAREGIVER'S PERSPECTIVE 6
(2002), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/The-Wide-Circle-of-Caregiving-
Chart-Pack.pdf
119 See Peter S. Arno et al., The Economic Value of Caregiving, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 182, 184.
2007]
402 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J [
in long-term care costs during the past ten years, and the steadily grow-
ing population, this figure is likely to be significantly larger today.
These figures suggest that although the cost of institutional care is
crippling the Medicaid budget, public coffers are in fact only supporting
a fraction of all long-term care. Private resources are already shouldering
a significant portion of the nation's long-term care needs, albeit through
the direct provision of services to loved ones rather than through the
outlay of cash to a professional caregiver. 2° Although in-home care is
generally less expensive than institutional care, the obligation to support
a loved one nonetheless imposes a significant economic burden on a
family. 121
Policy-makers believe that if government initiatives somehow dis-
courage this form of private care giving, or fail to promote it in conjunc-
tion with other solutions, then the costs of long-term care could rise
dramatically. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code offers a $3,200 personal
exemption for taxpayers who pay for or directly provide long-term care
services to qualified dependent family members living in the taxpayer's
home.12 2 State governments also provide income tax benefits to support
informal, in-home care. For instance, the state of California provides a
$500 income tax credit for caregivers. 123
Although these initiatives provide incentives for families to provide
care, they do not appear to impact the consumer choices of those who
receive such care. Given the stable preference for in-home care provided
by loved ones, and given that this preference is often viewed by consum-
ers as a reason not to engage in formal financial planning for long-term
120 See, e.g. White House Press Release, The President Triples His Long-Term Care Tax
Credit and Urges Congress to Pass a Long-Term Care Initiative in 2000 (Jan. 19, 2000), availa-
ble at http://clinton4.nara.govIWH/New/html/20000 19_4.html ("[T]he economic value of
care giving for families ranges from $4,800 to $10,400 per caregiver.").
121 For a moving depiction of the pressures family caregivers face, see CAROL S. ANESHENSEL
ET AL., PROFILES IN CAREGIVING: THE UNEXPECTED CAREER (1995).
122 26 U.S.C. § 151 (2004). The amount of the exemption is adjusted annually for inflation.
For 2005, the personal exemption amount is $3,200. See Rev. Proc. 2004-71, I.R.B. 2004-50,
970. The exemption was announced as part of President Clinton's health care proposal. See
Joshua M. Wiener, Commentary: Pitfalls of Tax Incentives for Long-Term Care, http://
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900205 (last visited February 3, 2007). Former President Clinton
explained the reasons for the initiative: "We cannot expect that every older American will be able
to fend for himself or herself .... [The long-term care tax exemption] would help to offset the
direct cost of long-term care ... as well as the indirect costs, like unpaid leave some caregivers
must take." Online NewsHour. Long-Term Care (PBS television broadcast Jan. 4, 1999).
123 See Franchise Tax Board, State Gives $500 Tax Credit for Qualified Caregivers, http://
www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/press/archivel2003/03-17.html.
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care, the provision of a tax incentive to family members appears unlikely
to impact initial consumer planning choices in appreciable ways.
Furthermore, informal, in-home care cannot be counted on as a
primary source of assistance. Although this form of care is ultimately
provided to some degree within most families, individuals simply cannot
predict whether they will in fact receive care from loved ones, or if such
care will be available to support advanced stages of care.' 24 Thus, to
better protect governmental resources, federal and state initiatives must
encourage formal financial planning for long-term care among those
who have the means to achieve such planning. Most of the incentives
presently designed to accomplish this task encourage consumers to
purchase long-term care insurance policies. 2 5 The following sections
introduce these incentives.
2. Long-Term Care Insurance Partnership Programs
Policy-makers believe that the ever-increasing popularity of "Medi-
caid planning," which broadly denotes the creative use of estate plan-
ning to shield assets and qualify for Medicaid long-term care benefits, 126
confirms that many consumers prefer to receive public assistance for
long-term care without having to initially "spend down" personal as-
sets. 127 Lawmakers and insurance companies have sought to leverage
this preference through the formation of long-term care insurance part-
nership programs ("partnership programs").1 28 Partnership programs ef-
fectively shift the initial expenses of long-term care to private resources
124 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125 See supra Part I.
126 One article provides: "[Medicaid estate planning] involves legal and financial approaches
to satisfying financial eligibility requirements for Medicaid, coverage for nursing home care.
More specifically, an individual's assets are sheltered with the intention of precluding considera-
tion of such assets in determining Medicaid eligibility." L. Curry, C. Gruman, & J. Robison,
Medicaid Estate Planning: Perceptions of Morality and Necessity, 41 GERONTOLOGIST 34 (2001).
127 Medicaid spend down provisions are explained supra, note 29.
128 See Joshua M. Wiener, Jane Tilly, & Susan M. Goldenson, Federal and State Initiatives to
Jump Start the Market for Private Long-Term Care Insurance, 8 ELDER L.J. 57, 90 (2000). How-
ever, while insurance companies initially supported partnership programs, there is some evidence
that insurers find these programs potentially harmful to their overall marketing strategies. Id.
(explaining that insurance companies initially supported the concept but ultimately receded
because, "[flrom the insurer's perspective, a long-term care partnership is unattractive because
• .. [l]ong-term care insurance is sold primarily by stressing that Medicaid is a 'terrible' program
with inferior access to poorer quality facilities").
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while allowing individuals to rely on public assistance for the balance of
their long-term care needs.129
Under the typical partnership program, a person who purchases a
designated long-term care insurance policy and uses the benefits of that
policy to pay for at least the minimum duration of care will be permit-
ted to receive Medicaid benefits for all remaining long-term care costs
without having to meet Medicaid asset spend down requirements.130 In
essence, a partnership policy provides the direct benefit of long-term
care coverage from the insurer, as well as the indirect benefit of a prefer-
ential Medicaid eligibility standard.13 1
Some commentators criticize the formation of partnership pro-
grams as a "flawed" policy solution. 132 These critics maintain that part-
nership programs reach more affluent persons, who might have been
inclined to purchase long-term care insurance policies notwithstanding
129 Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent Long-Term Care Policy Trends,
12 J.L. & POL. 195, 293 (1996).
The goal of partnership programs is to lessen the strain on public funds while provid-
ing more individuals with adequate coverage. The operating principle is that people
are encouraged to buy insurance. The incentive offered is that should the insurance
benefits run out, the State will cover the remaining expenses without the purchaser
needing to spend-down assets ....
Id.
130 See Thomas Day, About Medicaid Long Term Care, http://www.longtermcarelink.net/
eldercare/medicaidong-term-care.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
If you buy a long-term care insurance policy under the Partnership program, and you
use three years of nursing home care, or six years of home care, or some combination
of the two, you may apply for New York State Medicaid benefits and still retain all
your assets. You will, however, have to contribute your income to the cost of your
long-term care.
Id.
131 The New York State Partnership for Long-Term Care program website explains this two-
pronged benefit in more detail:
Like other long term care insurance policies, Partnership policies help you to remain
in control of your own assets, to increase your chances of receiving your preferred
choice of long term care and to maintain your own sense of independence and dig-
nity. In addition, Partnership policies-uniquely-enable you to directly control your
assets while shielding them from the Medicaid requirement that they be used to pay
for care. A Partnership policy preserves your possible future eligibility for Medicaid
payments for your long term care and other needs if you are income eligible at that
time.
See New York State Partnership for Long Term Care, http://hiicap.state.ny.us/ltclnysO5.htm (last
visited September 27, 2004).
132 See, e.g., Jonathan Roos, Senate OK's Long-Term Care Incentive, DEs MOINES REGISTER,
Mar. 11, 2004, at 4B (discussing reactions and criticisms when the Iowa Senate approved a bill
that would authorize partnership programs).
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these incentives; such persons should not be permitted to receive Medi-
caid benefits and retain their privileged financial circumstances. 133 Fur-
thermore, in light of the behavioral motivations described above,
partnership programs only appeal to persons who: 1) choose to confront
long-term care planning; 2) can accept that they may require long-term
care; and 3) do not mind the possibility of institutional care. Thus,
partnership programs may only be useful in speeding up the purchase of
long-term care insurance by individuals who probably would have paid
privately for nursing home care or eventually purchased long-term care
insurance policies without government incentives. Notwithstanding
these criticisms, partnership programs are likely to become more wide-
spread. In fact, President Bush's 2006 budget proposal contains a provi-
sion that enables states to develop new partnership programs. 134
3. Federal Income Tax Deductions for the Costs of Long-Term
Care Insurance
While partnership programs are currently available in only a hand-
ful of states, many more Americans-and their employers-can obtain
federal income tax benefits for the purchase of long-term care insurance
policies. The Internal Revenue Code allows employers to deduct the
cost of long-term care insurance policies when such policies are provided
to employees, and also allows individuals to deduct costs associated with
the purchase of individual policies if their employer does not reimburse
this expenditure. The Internal Revenue Code's current deductions,
along with a proposed version, are discussed below.
i. The Business Deduction for the Cost of Employer-Sponsored Long-
Term Care Insurance Policies
The overwhelming majority of employers in this country decline to
offer employer-sponsored long-term care insurance policies.' 35 Some
133 See id.
134 The 2006 budget proposal "includes a proposal to encourage the purchase of private long
term care insurance. The proposal would eliminate the existing statutory ban on new Partner-
ship for Long Term Care programs." See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS IN THE PRESIDENT'S 2006 BUDGET 191
(2005).
135 One report notes that only 0.2 percent of all U.S. employers with ten or more employees
offer group long-term care insurance policies, and only 8.7 percent of large employers offer such
plans. See JEREMY PINCUS, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF: EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR INCREASING SPONSORSHIP 1
(2000).
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authors surmise that most employers fail to see any logic in offering a
novel form of insurance if the benefits are only likely to materialize for
employees at a very distant point in the future.136 To reverse the private
market's reluctance to offer long-term care insurance benefits, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code provides an income tax expenditure for employer-
subsidized long-term care insurance policies. 137 Employers may deduct
the costs of employer-sponsored long-term care insurance policies from
taxable income. Thus, the Code treats the employer's contributions in
the same manner that it treats any other deductible business expense. 138
Additionally, the federal government and many state governments cur-
rently offer group long-term care plans to their employees. 139
Yet despite the public sector's lead, group insurance programs may
never become a universal long-term care payer source. Even when pri-
vate employers do provide group plans and employees are willing to pay
their portion of premiums, these insurance policies would only provide
the anticipated pay out if the employee retains the policy until long-
term care needs arise; given the mobility of the modern worker, perhaps
only a small portion of the group policies purchased today will continue
to be in force when the policyholder's long-term care needs arise.
Thus, long-term care financing via group insurance plans will
likely remain the exception, not the norm. In possible recognition of
this reality, policy-makers have also introduced tax benefits to encourage
Americans to purchase long-term care insurance policies on their own.
These initiatives are discussed below.
ii. The Current Individual Deduction
In 1996, the federal government began offering a deduction from
taxable income for unreimbursed expenses associated with the purchase
of individual long-term care insurance policies. 140 Taxpayers may de-
duct a portion of the cost of long-term care insurance purchased for the
136 Wiener et al., supra note 128, at 73.
137 See 26 U.S.C. § 7702B(a)(3) (2004) (explaining that "any plan of an employer providing
coverage under a qualified long-term care insurance contract shall be treated as an accident and
health plan with respect to such coverage").
138 See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2004) (permitting deductions for all "ordinary and necessary" ex-
penses incurred in the operation of a taxpayer's business).
139 See Wiener et. al., supra note 128, at 73-74.
140 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(10) (2004). If the taxpayer receives reimbursement for any of these
expenses, he or she must reduce the total amount deducted by the amount that was reimbursed.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 17 (2003).
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taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, and the taxpayer's dependents, to the
extent that the total cost of all medical expenses exceeds 7.5 percent of
total adjusted gross income.141 The amount of the deduction is limited,
with graduating caps based on the taxpayer's age. Presently, the tax-
payer may deduct $260 if he is younger than forty; $490 if he is from
forty to fifty years of age, $980 if he is from fifty to sixty, $2,600 if he is
from sixty to seventy, and $3,250 for age seventy and over. 142
While income tax deductions can be viewed as a means of encour-
aging an overall shift of long-term care costs from public to private re-
sources, these initiatives carry significant attendant costs.' 43  For
instance, it is estimated that the individual income tax deduction for
long-term care insurance policies will cost the federal government over
$28 billion in lost tax revenue in the years 2004-2013.144 While this
amount is small in comparison to total anticipated tax revenues during
the same period, it nonetheless represents a governmental expenditure in
an amount that, if spent elsewhere, might have greater utility.
The federal government has targeted these incentives at individuals
who have the means to afford private long-term care insurance. The
current "below-the-line" deduction has a greater impact on middle- and
upper-class taxpayers because these more affluent Americans are more
likely to have enough other deductions-such as a home mortgage in-
terest deduction-to justify itemizing on their returns. 45 In fact, one
141 26 U.S.C. § 213.
142 Id. at § 213(d)(10); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 140. Under
213(d)(10) (B), these amounts are adjusted annually for the percentage increase in the medi-
cal-care component of the consumer price index. 42 U.S.C. § 213. The figures provided above
are for 2004. Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184.
143 The tax deduction for long-term care insurance is arguably a "'subsidy' because it reduces
the cost of acquiring [long-term care insurance] by reducing the tax burden of [long-term care
insurance purchasers]." Mann, supra note 115, at 1353 n.2 4 (analyzing the home mortgage
interest deduction).
144 Treasury Releases Blue Book Detailing Tax Proposals in White House Budget, TAx NOTES
TODAY, Feb. 4, 2003, at 174, 181.
145 See id. This argument is often made with respect to income tax deductions. See, e.g.,
Mann, supra note 115, at 1353 n.28.
A major criticism of the home mortgage interest deduction is that it primarily benefits
middle to upper income taxpayers .... Such inequitable subsidies are defensible as
instruments for improving housing quality only if the national goal is to encourage
the relatively well-to-do to buy even better housing than they would buy without a
subsidy.
Id. (quoting HENRY J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICIES? 163 (1972)) (citations omitted).
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analyst reported that only 28 percent of taxpayers with an adjusted gross
income below $100,000 itemize deductions. 146
Thus, the federal government's tax expenditure, which subsidizes
long-term care insurance, targets individuals who probably have the re-
sources to assume the entire cost of long-term care through the procure-
ment of private insurance without the subsidy, but have declined to do
so for some other reason-such as a preference for in-home care pro-
vided by loved ones, or a belief that they will not require long-term
care.' 4 7 As the following section reveals, a proposed above-the-line de-
duction would substantially increase the breadth of the federal govern-
ment's attempts to promote the purchase of long-term care insurance.
iii. The Proposed Above-the-Line Deduction
Beyond the presently allowable deduction, a more generous deduc-
tion has been included in recent budgetary and legislative proposals. 148
President Bush's 2004 budget proposal would have allowed a deduction
for certain costs associated with the purchase of long-term care insur-
ance without reference to the taxpayer's total medical expenses.1 4 9 This
"above-the-line" deduction would permit individuals to receive the ben-
efit of a deduction even if they do not itemize on their returns. 5 As a
result, greater numbers of taxpayers could deduct the costs of long-term
care insurance from taxable income, and the government would be
called upon to subsidize a greater number of insurance policies.15
146 One author found that "IRS 2000 Statistics of Income data show that over 90 percent of
individuals with [adjusted gross income ("AGI")] of $100,000 or more itemized their deduc-
tions, whereas only about 28 percent of individuals with AGI under $100,000 did." Leandra
Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1460 (2004).
147 Lawmakers probably believe that more affluent individuals make a choice to rely on
Medicaid because it provides full coverage with relatively few costs. Indeed, there is some social
science support for this position. See, e.g., Pauly, supra note 86.
148 The proposal initially appeared in the Ronald Reagan Alzheimer's Breakthrough Act of
2004, S. 2533, 108th Cong. § 305 (2004). The bill was described as containing "language long
sought by the insurance industry." Steven Brostoff, Reagan Memorial Bill Includes LTC, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, June 21, 2004, at 8.
149 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FiscAL YEAR 2004, at 71
(2003) (describing the above-the-line deduction).
150 See Ottens, supra note 114, at 755-56.
151 An "above-the-line" deduction would allow approximately 70 percent of taxpayers-those
who do nor itemize deductions-to claim the benefit. Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conun-
drum: Toward a Rational Financing of Long-Term Care, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 47, 74-75 (2004)
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However, an income tax deduction-whether below or above the
line-is unlikely to have a broad enough impact on aggregate consumer
behavior. As an initial matter, deductions have no effect on those with
the lowest incomes. Despite the rhetoric used by those who favor an
above-the-line deduction, any type of deduction will ultimately have a
greater affect on more affluent consumers. For example, economists
have argued that approximately forty-four percent of the United States
population reside in households that show no tax liability: for these in-
dividuals, a deduction would not provide additional benefits. 5 2 Sec-
ond, even among taxpayers who are able to claim them, deductions
reduce taxable income by an amount that varies based on the income
bracket of the taxpayer: each dollar of a deduction will yield a ten cent
benefit for somebody in the lowest tax bracket, and a thirty-five cent
benefit for somebody in the highest bracket.' 5 3 Of course, there is in-
herent logic in the use of a deduction to offset the cost of long-term care
insurance: typically, only those with sufficient incomes will be able to
purchase such a policy.
However, the impact of these provisions is questionable even with
regard to their intended beneficiaries. Although policy-makers hope
these incentives will motivate more affluent consumers to engage in fi-
nancial planning for long-term care, the narrowly tailored emphasis on
long-term care insurance policies runs counter to most of the unique
behavioral motivations described above. 54 Long-term care insurance is
typically used to finance institutional care rather than in-home care pro-
(citing Scott M. Hollenbeck & Maureen Keenan Kahr, Individual Income Tax Returns, 1997:
Early Tax Estimates, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Winter 1998-99, at 132, 145-46).
152 Furthermore:
[R]oughly fourteen million individuals and families will earn some income but not
enough to be required to file a tax return. When these non-filers are added to the
zero-tax filers, they add up to fifty-eight million income-earning households who will
be paying no income taxes .... When all of the dependents of these income-produc-
ing households are counted, roughly 122 million Americans-44 percent of the U.S.
population-are outside of the federal income tax system.
J. Scott Moody & Scott A. Hodge, The Growing Class of Americans Who Pay No Federal Income
Taxes, THE TAx FOUNDATION (2004), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/researchl
show/206.html.
153 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING PROJECT, TAX CODE TREAT-
MENT OF LONG-TERM CARE AND LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE FACT SHEET, available at
http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/taxcode.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
154 See supra Part I.C.
2007]
410 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J [
vided by loved ones. 155 Also, it should be purchased at a fairly young
age, 156 and it requires consumers to accept that they may need long-
term care and that this risk is high enough to justify present-day sacri-
fices to purchase a rather costly insurance product. Therefore, tax in-
centives to purchase long-term care insurance will only affect consumers
who have reached this level of awareness.
Although Congress never adopted the more generous deduction, 157
the proposal has not been set aside completely. Several prominent inter-
est groups continue to advocate heavily for the more generous deduc-
tion. 158  In fact, as recently as March 2005, the "above-the-line"
deduction was reintroduced in Congress as part of the Ronald Reagan
Alzheimer's Breakthrough Act of 2005.159 As the following section
reveals, the push for more generous tax incentives has also had an im-
pact .on state-level income tax provisions.
4. State-Level Income Tax Incentives for the Purchase of Long- Term
Care Insurance
Beyond the federal initiatives described in the preceding sections,
numerous other tax incentives have been developed on the state level.
In some states that levy income taxes, incentives mirror the federal tax
deduction, so that a portion of the cost of long-term care insurance
premiums may be deducted from taxable income if the total cost ex-
ceeds a certain percentage of total adjusted gross income. 160  Other
155 Thirty-Four Percent of Elderly Use Long-Term Care Insurance In-Home, BAIT. SUN, Feb. 7,
2007, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/investing/bal-bz.ym.ltinsure04febO4,
0,758017.story.
156 See infra note 174.
157 The above-the-line deduction was never added to the Internal Revenue Code, and it does
not appear in the most recent budget proposal. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ExEc.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR
2006.
158 The American Health Care Association and the National Center for Assisted Living advo-
cate for an above-the-line deduction. See, e.g., AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION, ISSUE
BRIEF: UTILIZING TAX INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CHOICE IN
LONG-TERM CARE PLANNING (2004), available at http://www.schmalberg.com/ib tax-credits.
pdf.
159 S. 602, 109th Cong., § 305 (2005), available at http://www.ltcconsultants.com/agent/
articles/reagan alzheimers.shtml. Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski introduced the proposal on March
10, 2005. Id.
160 For a list of these states, see AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., STATES OFFERING TAx INCENTIVES
FOR LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE, 2002 (2003), http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/longterm/Arti-
cles/a2003-06-23-taxincentives-.html.
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states have chosen to offer more generous deductions or credits to tax-
payers that purchase qualified long-term care insurance policies. 6 ' For
instance, Maryland allows taxpayers who are forty-one and older to
claim a state income tax credit of up to $500 for each long-term care
insurance policy purchased for the taxpayer or qualified members of the
taxpayer's family. 162 Colorado also provides a state income tax credit,
which is capped at the lesser of $150 or 25 percent of the amount paid
for insurance premiums during the year.
163
As these examples reveal, the federal government is not the only
public entity investing tax revenues in the hopes that more Americans
will turn to private insurance policies when long-term care needs arise.
State governments are also joining in this venture. The following sec-
tion discusses the impact these government incentives have had on the
long-term care insurance industry, and investigates further whether
these investments are likely to ease the long-term care financing crisis by
modifying consumer behavior.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT: THE PERCEIVED
BENEFIT OF LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
In virtually all of the initiatives discussed above, the federal and
state governments offer tax subsidies to encourage individuals to
purchase private long-term care insurance. 164  Market performance
reveals that the long-term care industry is growing significantly as a re-
sult of these incentives.' 65 Although long-term care insurance has been
available for over two decades, 166 this form of healthcare coverage has
161 See id
162 See Comptroller of Maryland: Information for Individual Taxpayers, Long-Term Care
Insurance Credit, http://individuals.marylandtaxes.com/incometax/gtpitc/longterm.asp (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2007).
163 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-122 (2006).
164 For a general discussion of long-term care insurance, see, e.g., BEN LIPSON, J.K. LASSER'S
CHOOSING THE RIGHT LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE (2002).
165 See CORONEL, supra note 59, at 15. One author contends that the long-term care insur-
ance market is potentially very profitable because the aggregate risk during any given year is
actually very low: "Though about one in four will reside in a nursing home at some point, fewer
than 5 percent of our nation's elderly are in nursing homes at any one time." John A. Miller,
Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 131 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81,
104 (2003).
166 Dina Shapiro Frenkel, Planning Ahead-Be Prepared For Long- Term Care, DAILY RECORD
(Balt.), April 12, 2004 ("[L]ong-term care insurance has been around for longer than twenty
years.").
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been virtually ignored by consumers until very recently.1 67 Over the
past two decades, the industry has enjoyed average annual growth of 21
percent.168
Only a small portion of today's seniors carry long-term care insur-
ance. 169 However, increasing numbers of consumers plan to draw upon
such policies when nursing home care becomes necessary. By the year
2002, there were over nine million long-term care policies in force in the
United States. 170  While the percentage of policies purchased through
employer-sponsored plans is increasing, the majority of in-force policies
were purchased on an individual basis. 17 1
Although these figures suggest that the tax and economic incen-
tives described above are having some effect on consumer behavior, it is
important to carefully consider the legislative intent behind government
incentives that promote long-term care insurance. In developing tax
and economic incentives, federal and state legislators assume that, in
most cases, a long-term care insurance policy purchased today will pay
out by assuming the cost of the insured's ultimate long-term care
needs. 72 However, in arriving at this long-term result, the initial con-
sumer choice to purchase a long-term care insurance policy is only the
first step: the consumer must subsequently choose to renew, maintain,
and draw upon the policy.
Although insurers generally view insurance policies as annual
agreements that indemnify the insured when trigger events occur in that
year, the pay out envisioned by policy-makers is a cumulative benefit of
protection over the insured's lifetime.173 To help ensure the availabil-
167 In 1995, just one year before the federal government enacted the individual income tax
deduction for long-term care insurance, only 7.5 percent of nursing home costs were paid by
private insurance plans. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., REPORT ON HEALTH: U.S. 2001, at
333, Table 118 (2001).
168 Thomas Day, About Long-Term Care Insurance, http://www.longtermcarelink.netl
aboutinsurance.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
169 According to a 2002 report, "less than 15 percent of all individuals over sixty-five and
fewer than 5 percent of those under sixty-five have these policies." MARC A. COHEN, HEALTH
INS. ASS'N OF AMERICA, BENEFITS OF LONG-TERM CARIE INSURANCE 5 (2002).
170 CORONEL, supra note 59, at 15.
171 Id. at 21.
172 These expectations are also reflected in insurance industry reports. See COHEN, supra
note 169, at 5 (explaining that long-term care insurance policies will reduce Medicaid expendi-
tures by approximately $5,000 per policyholder, but relying on a calculation which does not
take lapses into account).
173 See STEPHEN F. ROwLEY, THE CONSUMERS' GUIDE TO LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE
passim (2004).
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ity-and in some cases the affordability-of such lifetime risk protec-
tion, consumers should purchase long-term care insurance at a fairly
young age. 174 Although the actual risk of long-term care needs arising
during these early years is insignificant for most insured persons, policy-
holders pay premiums to maintain coverage until they are technically
"uninsurable" due to illness, disability, or old age-at which point the
policy would begin to pay for needed services. In this manner, long-
term care insurance provides a dual benefit: an annual policy that pro-
vides financial risk protection for long-term care needs that are triggered
by events occurring in that year, and a renewal option, which provides
continuous protection against the risk of becoming a greater actuarial
risk over time. 175 Only when a policy remains in force, and ultimately
assumes the insured's lifelong financial risk of long-term care, can it be
said that the policy abolished the insured's need to turn to Medicaid for
long-term care financing.
As a result, even if government incentives are encouraging growing
numbers of individuals to purchase long-term care insurance, the likeli-
hood that these policies will ultimately provide the desired lifelong risk
protection is highly susceptible to intervening events. Most obviously,
the insurer or the insured may discontinue the policy ("lapse") at some
174 A 1999 report found that "a typical policy with inflation protection would cost $649 a
year for a forty-year-old, $1,802 a year for a sixty-five-year-old and $5,895 a year for a seventy-
nine-year-old." ThinkingAhead: Long-Term Care, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 2005, at El (citing a
1999 Kaiser Family Foundation report). One article summarized the predicament of the typical
long-term care insurance ["LTCI"] purchaser thus:
The timing of an LTCI purchase is important as age is the primary factor in determin-
ing its cost .... [T]he insurance industry encourages the purchase of LTCI when the
insured is young and healthy. This can be risky, however. Someone who buys LTCI at
age forty is unlikely to need the services for thirty-five years or more, and predicting
the circumstances thirty-five years in the future is obviously impossible.
Clofine & Kiersz, supra note 38, at 149. Yet despite these uncertainties, younger consumers are
still in a better position to avoid insurer denials based on allegedly preexisting conditions. See,
e.g., Victoria Colliver, Consumers' Worry-Will Insurer Pay If They Need Care, S.F. CHRON.,
May 15, 2005, at El (describing recent litigation between a seventy-seven-year-old Alzheimer's
patient and an insurer, where the insurer argued that the insured "knowingly concealed symp-
toms of memory loss when he bought the policy ten years ago" because, although diagnostic
testing at that time revealed no abnormalities, the patient had complained about memory loss).
175 For a discussion of this dual nature of long-term care insurance policies, see Amy Finkel-
stein, Kathleen McGarry, & Amir Sufi, Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence
from Long-Term Care Insurance 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11039),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11039 ("In a dynamic framework, risk averse individ-
uals benefit not only from period-by-period 'event' insurance, but also from insurance against
becoming a bad risk and being reclassified into a higher risk group with a concomitant increase
in premiums.").
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point between the first year and the year in which the insured's long-
term care needs arise. 176 When a lapse occurs, the now uninsured indi-
vidual may turn to Medicaid if long-term care needs arise.
A recent poll of insurance companies revealed that 72 percent of
long-term care insurance policies ever sold were still in force in Decem-
ber 2002.177 However, a closer review suggests that these figures may
reflect the newness of the market rather than the durability of policies.
At the time the report was published, approximately half of all long-
term care insurance policies had been purchased within the preceding
five years. 178 In fact, another study released in 2002 reported that, each
year, policyholders deliberately cancel approximately 7 percent of in-
force policies. 179 Thus, as the market matures, the in-force ratio will
likely decline.
Recent studies attempt to explain annual lapse rates based on tradi-
tional insurance theories, such as emerging risk awareness and adverse
selection.18 ° However, such efforts decline to consider behavioral moti-
vations such as those described above. 181 The likelihood of lapses-or,
indeed, any intervening events that stand to frustrate legislative intent-
should be considered and studied through a variety of academic and
theoretical lenses. As the following section reveals, the behavioral model
provides a more sophisticated modeling of long-term care consumer
choice, and reveals that current tax and economic incentives have a
much more limited application than insurance market growth suggests.
176 Clofine and Kiersz further explain that although a younger insurance purchaser will have
the benefit of lower premiums initially, they are more at risk of having inadequate coverage once
long-term care needs arise, or of having their premiums increased once they are already on a
fixed retirement income. Clofine & Kiersz, supra note 38, at 149.
177 CORONEL, supra note 59, at 23.
178 Id. at 21.
179 SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, LONG-TERM CARE EXPERIENCE COMMIT-FEE INTER-COMPANY
STUDY: 1984-1999, at 35 (2002), available at http://www.soa.org/ccm/content/areas-of-prac-
tice/special-interest-sections/long-term-care-insurance/actuarial/papers-presentations-research-re-
sources/i 984-1999-1ong-term-care-experience-committees-intercompany-study/.
180 A recent paper argues that these lapse rates reflect the fact that consumers constantly
revalue their risk for long-term care and allow the policy to lapse once they determine that the
cost of maintaining the policy outweighs their continued risk for financial exposure. See Finkel-
stein et al., supra note 175, at 12. The authors reach this conclusion by correlating lapses with
subsequent nursing home admission. Id. at 8-9. Finding that those who allow policies to lapse
are significantly less likely to enter a nursing home, the authors conclude that those who lapse
believe they have a reduced risk of long-term care. Id. at 11.
181 See supra Part I.C.
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IV. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF LONG-TERM CARE PLANNING
Once behavioral motivations are factored into the analysis, it seems
that the long-term care consumer decision is comprised of five distinct
choices. Each choice should be understood as an incremental level,
upon which a rational consumer may choose to remain without going
any further in the decision-making process.
A. Choice 1: To Plan or Not to Plan
At Choice 1, many consumers simply choose not to even think
about long-term care planning because overall utility is significantly di-
minished by any serious reflection on the topic. 182 Therefore, the ra-
tional consumer who fails to plan and ultimately turns to Medicaid
probably never actually evaluated the question of how to pay for long-
term care, but rather exercised rational decision-making with regard to
the question of whether to think about long-term care planning at all. 183
In essence, the rational actor chooses to "satisfice" with regard to all
remaining choices,184 and rationally declines to gather information, rank
preferences, or evaluate alternatives about various long-term care financ-
ing options.
As many as one-fifth of consumers decline to go any farther than
Choice 1. In a nationwide survey, individuals over the age of fifty-five
were asked how they plan to pay in the event that long-term care needs
arise. Twenty percent declined to select options reflecting personal, fa-
milial, or governmental sources of support, and responded that they
"don't know."'81 5 Consumers in this category are unlikely to respond to
financial incentives to purchase long-term care insurance unless the ben-
efits are overwhelming.
182 See supra Part I.C.l.i.
183 This rationale seems to be reflected in the findings of a recent AARP survey of over 1,000
members residing in the state of New York. When asked why they do not own long-term care
insurance, 16 percent of respondents said they "never considered it," and another 8 percent of
respondents answered that they "don't know." In contrast, only 1 percent responded that they
"will rely on State/Medicaid." BRIDGES, supra note 76, at 2.
184 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
185 LIFEP ANS, INC., supra note 74, at 22. Respondents were also given the option to respond,
"Medicaid or Medicare," "Other Health Insurance," or "Self or Family." Id. The fact that the
survey was conducted on a mailed, paper-based form is significant because it suggests that re-
spondents were given an opportunity to consider each option before making a final selection.
Id.
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B. Choice 2: Develop a Financial Plan, or Rely on Informal Care
at Home
At Choice 2, among consumers who opt to think about long-term
care needs, many will ultimately choose not to develop a formal plan
because they receive greater utility from the continuation of a present
belief that family members will someday provide care.' " There is a
corollary explanation: even among decision-makers that approach this
choice with a desire to advance economic interests, some will choose
informal, in-home care because they genuinely believe that this type of
care will provide greater practical and financial utility in the future.
Consumers in this category are so deeply biased by custom and tradi-
tion, or by a fear of institutional care, that data or statistics on the costs
of-or need for-professional care will have little impact. Furthermore,
among consumers who prefer informal, in-home care but believe family
members will decline to provide it if the consumer has purchased long-
term care insurance, purchasing such a policy would defeat the con-
sumer's primary goal. Consequently, tax or economic incentives are un-
likely to motivate such consumers.
C. Choice 3: Assuming the Consumer Does Not Prefer Informal, In-
Home Care, How Costs and Benefits Should be Weighed When
Developing a Financial Plan
Among those consumers who do not have a preference for infor-
mal, in-home care provided by loved ones, the behavioral economics
model is instrumental in demonstrating how rational actors assign utility
to financial values and make decisions among various planning devices.
Currently, most middle- to upper-class consumers who are open to the
possibility of institutional care can choose between three options: they
can plan to pay privately from personal assets, they can plan to pay
privately through a long-term care insurance policy, or they can choose
to rely on public assistance.' 8 7 While less fortunate persons can plan to
rely on Medicaid simply by allowing their financial circumstances to
remain as they are, most middle- to upper-class consumers who choose
the latter option must take proactive steps to divest assets long before
the relevant lookback period is likely to commence. 88
186 See supra text accompanying notes 78 and 79.
187 See sources cited supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
188 See Miller, supra note 31, at 81.
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In weighing these options, immediate costs or benefits will often
have a more pronounced impact on utility, and more remote costs or
benefits will have considerably less influence. 8 9 For some consumers,
the "multiple selves" phenomenon may lead to significant detachment
between the present-oriented self, who must make an immediate finan-
cial sacrifice, and the future self, who might benefit from careful plan-
ning.' 90 Some consumers believe that the future incapacitated self is so
removed from the present self, almost feeling like a "non-self' or an
"impossible self," that any benefits received by this future self should not
be factored into utility calculations.' 91
Thus, consumers may undervalue future benefits to such a signifi-
cant degree that they ultimately choose to forego the opportunity to
purchase long-term care insurance or engage in other planning tech-
niques. When long-term care needs arise, such consumers will be re-
quired to spend down assets, enroll in Medicaid, and expose their
principal residence to estate recovery."92 This negative outcome could
have been prevented by the purchase of insurance, so the initial failure
to do so appears irrational. However, the prospective purchaser may
believe that the risk will never materialize in his own lifetime, but would
rather affect the incapacitated "non-self. '""93 Alternatively, consumers in
this category may disproportionately value immediate interests as well as
the future interests of their descendants, and engage in Medicaid plan-
ning to protect their immediate financial interests and their descendants'
access to their wealth upon death."94 Among those consumers who be-
lieve the future incapacitated-self is a "non-self," it appears to be irrele-
vant that this plan exposes the future self to all of the risks associated
189 See supra Part I.C.
190 See supra text accompanying note 103.
191 See id.
192 See supra Part II for a description of Medicaid eligibility requirements.
193 See supra Part I.C.2.iii.
194 The following anecdote captures the apparent irony in such decisions:
When the agent learned we had [no company that would provide long term care
insurance for a man in his nineties], he thought they could do some Medicaid plan-
ning instead. I gasped and said, "Why in the world do that? ...Here we have an
individual who is coming into the final phase of life, who has accumulated over his
ninety plus years a tidy sum of a half a million dollars. Why wouldn't we want these
last years to be the very best for him and his family? I don't believe Medicaid planning
... will do that for him, but his own money will!"
Timothy L. Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Revisiting the Ethics of Medicaid Planning, NAELA
Q. Summer 2004, 29, 29 (2004).
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with complete reliance on public assistance during a vulnerable life
stage. 1
D. Choice 4. Once Costs and Benefits are Weighed, Assuming the
Consumer Wishes to Provide for the Future Incapacitated Self, What to
Include in the Long-Term Care Plan
At Choice 4, assuming the consumer does not prefer informal, in-
home care, and assuming the consumer wishes to provide for the future
incapacitated self, then most middle- to upper-class consumers would
probably plan to pay privately for long-term care, rather than rely on
public assistance by spending down assets and exposing the principal
residence to estate recovery. Since current federal and state laws provide
immediate financial benefits that help offset the costs of long-term care
insurance, the regulatory scheme in most states probably tips the bal-
ance toward purchasing such a policy.' 96 Perhaps demonstrating this,
authors of an attitudinal study of long-term care insurance buyers com-
piled responses and classified buyers as "planners,"'197 who are primarily
concerned with financial well-being.
E. Choice 5: Whether to Maintain the Initial Plan
Although policy-makers have primarily focused on how to influ-
ence consumers when they make their initial set of decisions regarding
long-term care, all forms of private planning also require some type of
affirmative, ongoing action to maintain the choice until long-term care
needs arise. For instance, to maintain a long-term care insurance policy,
a consumer must agree to renew the insurance contract, pay premiums,
and seek care in accordance with contract terms. As a result, policy-
makers cannot ignore the crucial Choice 5: whether to maintain the
initial plan in the face of ever changing emotional, behavioral, and pecu-
niary needs.
Most importantly, the preferences and time functions described
above can surface and even resurface at any point. For instance, if a
consumer reaches Choice 4 and makes the initial decision to purchase
195 One risk associated with complete reliance on Medicaid is that the beneficiary may not be
able to reside in a nursing home of his choice, since not every facility accepts all forms of public
assistance. See CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDE TO CHOOSING A NURSING HOME 36 (2002), available at http://
www.feddesk.com/freehandbooks/ 1216-4.pdf.
196 See supra Part I.B.
197 CORONEL, supra note 59.
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long-term care insurance based largely on tax and economic incentives,
the consumer might not yet have confronted or factored in other moti-
vations. Similarly, a consumer who ultimately arrived at Choice 4 in his
mid-fifties will abandon the policy in his late-sixties if he unexpectedly
rethinks Choice 2 and determines that in-home care would be superior
to institutional care of any sort.
Furthermore, where tax and economic incentives are a primary
motivation, consumers will be enticed to rethink their long-term care
plan once they cross over into retirement. Fixed income retirees may no
longer have sufficient income to pay premiums, and they may no longer
benefit significantly from income tax incentives.1 98 Yet ironically, the
transition into retirement is a vulnerable point in person's life, when
consumers are particularly susceptible to the emotional and behavioral
motivations described above. For instance, as an age cohort crosses into
retirement and no longer benefits appreciably from income tax incen-
tives, and as the desire for in-home care and the fear of institutional care
becomes more pervasive in that cohort,1 99 then the immediate and fu-
ture benefits of maintaining long-term care insurance will be out-
weighed by emotional interests. Correspondingly, as the consumer
watches friends and loved ones become incapacitated, her ability to
think in purely financial terms about planning will likely decline as her
need for comfort and reassurance will rise. A consumer who begins to
fear institutional care, or who desires to begin "living in the moment 2 °°
rather than fixating on her own possible incapacitation might find that
her utility is maximized by canceling what may have grown to be a
rather costly insurance policy.
V. DISCUSSION: TAx AND ECONOMIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on the foregoing model of the five choices faced by long-
term care consumers, lawmakers can use tax and economic policies to
influence consumer behavior at Choice 4. Choice 4 is the only level
upon which most consumers approach the decision with sufficient def-
198 A survey of AARP members in New York found that younger age cohorts appear to value
income tax incentives more than their older, retired peers. BRIDGES, supra note 76, at 2
("Younger members and working members also say they would be more likely to buy a long-
term care policy if the State offered larger tax credits for the amount of premiums paid (65
percent [ages fifty to sixty-four] vs. 40 percent [ages sixty-five and over]; 62 percent working vs.
46 percent not working).").
199 See supra Part I.C.Li.
200 See supra text accompanying note 106.
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erence to pecuniary concerns, since they do not appear to be driven by
unique long-term care preferences and time functions. Yet most con-
sumers who arrive at Choice 4 would probably be motivated to purchase
long-term care insurance without considerable new incentives, since
long-term care insurance is an attractive option under current Medicaid
estate recovery laws and asset spend down requirements. 2 ' At best, tax
and economic incentives may expedite consumer arrival at Choice 4, but
only among those who process preferences and time functions in ways
that would have enabled them to arrive at Choice 4 in due course.
However, it is unclear whether consumers who have already
reached Choice 4 are immune to these other influences, or if they sim-
ply have not yet confronted them. It is quite plausible that those con-
sumers who have reached Choice 4 were simply wearing the hat of a
comprehensive financial planner, and have not yet given significant con-
sideration to the broader reaches of this particular decision-making
arena. Thus, even where tax and economic incentives have successfully
motivated a consumer to progress through the first four choices and
ultimately purchase a long-term care insurance policy, continuous reval-
uing and reweighing over time can cause the consumer to allow a long-
term care insurance policy to lapse.202 Once returned to the state of
non-planning, the consumer is again prone to each of the behavioral
motivations described above.20 3 As the consumer progresses once more
through the first four levels of long-term care consumer choice, several
outcomes are possible: he may choose to avoid any reconsideration of
future long-term care needs, he may develop a preference for in-home
care, or he might choose to rely on Medicaid. Thus, despite a signifi-
cant governmental expenditure to support alternative private payer
sources, 20 4 there is simply no guarantee that federal and state govern-
ments will not be called upon to provide indemnification for consumers
in the area of long-term care. The potential for intervening action, and
particularly consumer-initiated lapses, is too great.
As these contingencies reveal, long-term care planning is an area
where typical tax and economic incentives may not be a dependable
solution. When consumer choice cannot be sufficiently modified to
achieve the desired governmental outcome, a compulsory program may
201 See supra Part II.
202 See supra Part V.E.
203 See supra Part I.C.
204 See Ottens, supra note 114, at 749.
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be necessary. While federal and state legislatures will ultimately need to
develop the appropriate solution, various commentators have posited a
variety of appealing options. 20 5 For instance, Medicaid can continue to
provide a means-tested long-term care benefit, but a separate wage tax
would support the expense. 2 6 Likewise, a mandatory savings plan can
be implemented, whereby Americans redirect some portion of income
into a tax-preferred investment account.2 7
As a further option, states can develop compulsory programs
whereby all adults are required to pay an annual amount into a state-
administered reserve fund.208  Amounts owed could be collected
through employer withholdings or by direct assessments on individuals.
Individuals may be exempted from payment of the tax if they can show
that their current asset and income levels enable them to presently qual-
ify for Medicaid.20 9 Medicaid would continue to operate in virtually the
same manner, but state-level compulsory programs would pay out bene-
fits for long-term care needs arising in persons over the age of sixty-
five.210
To protect the financial health of these programs, they can be
modeled after partnership programs. 21 1 For example, a state-level com-
pulsory program could assume the costs of enrollees' first three years of
long-term care, and Medicaid would assume the remainder of costs
based on the preferential eligibility standard typically applied in partner-
ship programs.212
205 See sources cited infra notes 206 and 207.
206 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 151, at 74-75 (recommending that the Medicare program
assume payments for nursing home care, while all other forms of long-term care should be
privately financed); Kazutoshi Miyazawa, Panos Moudoukoutas, & Tadashi Tagi, Is Public Long-
Term Care Insurance Necessary?, 67 J. RISK & INS. 249 (2000) (recommending a universal, public
insurance program for long-term care).
207 HEARING BEFORE THE S. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 106th Cong. (2000) (state-
ment of Allan Kanner, Kanner & Associates, Tulane Law School) (recommending that Congress
reform regulations governing privately held medical savings accounts so that these funds could
be used to finance long-term care needs).
208 A plan of this sort was proposed in Hawaii. The Hawaii model was passed by the state
legislature but ultimately vetoed by the governor. See, e.g., Helen Altonn, Coalition for Long-
Term Care Disbands, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Dec. 4, 2003.
209 In this manner, the program would render "Medicaid planning" very difficult, since indi-
viduals would be assessed based on present-day asset and incomes.
210 Since the incidence of long-term care needs among persons under the age of sixty-five is
much lower, Medicaid could still be used to support this expense.
211 Partnership Programs are described supra, Part II.B.2.
212 See supra note 130.
2007]
422 CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J.
A program of this sort would provide a number of benefits.213
First, the compulsory nature would stimulate participants to make pre-
sent-day sacrifices for the future incapacitated self, without requiring
participants to progress through the first four choices. Thus, the pro-
gram would overcome many of the behavioral tendencies noted
above.214 Second, since the risk would be spread over a much wider
population and over a larger range of age cohorts versus private long-
term care insurance policies, premiums could be significantly lower than
those offered in the private market. Finally, to preserve informal, in-
home care as a viable option for families, states could explore ways to
support family care giving.
CONCLUSION
Policy-makers must reevaluate tax and economic initiatives that en-
courage private planning for long-term care. While these programs ap-
pear to have limited success with encouraging consumers to more
rapidly reach Choice 4, these initiatives do not address the potential for
adverse outcomes at all other levels of consumer choice. For example,
tax and economic incentives have no bearing on those who prefer in-
home care from loved ones and do not wish to jeopardize the likelihood
of receiving such care by purchasing a private insurance policy; nor do
they affect consumers who significantly underestimate their future need
for long-term care. Similarly, current tax and economic incentives do
not address the potential for lapses, particularly as consumers grow older
and retire, and as long-term care planning increasingly becomes a proxy
for emotional interests. If policy-makers have not anticipated the poten-
213 Of course, not all observers agree that these programs are a good idea. Stephen Moses, of
the Center on Long-Term Care Financing, explained that the Hawaii program's one year limita-
tion on benefits would not sufficiently insulate the Medicaid budget from long-term care ex-
penses. Furthermore, the program would impair the private insurance industry's growth "by
reducing the public's sense of urgency regarding long-term care risk and cost," and "reward
irresponsible health and lifestyle behaviors and punish healthy behaviors by charging all partici-
pants the same 'premium' regardless of the level of risk they bring into the risk pool." Interest-
ingly, these critiques are based on a very different view of consumer choice in the long-term care
insurance market. Moses appears to believe that consumers can and will make financial and
health-related choices to advance the needs of the future, incapacitated self. See STEPHEN
MOSES, GRASSROOT INSTITUTE OF HAWAII, IN PURSUIT OF . . . HAWATI'S CAREPLUS PRO-
GRAM: REPORT ON HAWAII'S PROPOSED CAREPLUS MANDATORY LTC INSURANCE PROGRAM
1 (2002), available at http://www.grassrootinstitute.org/Publications/InPursuit/InPursuit200
211.pdf.
214 See supra Part II.
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tial for outcomes that are adverse to legislative intent, then the baby
boomer generation has the sheer numbers to turn miscalculations into
budgetary disaster.21 5
While legislation premised on consumer choice theory can produce
outcomes that replicate a compulsory regime, 216 policy-makers must
recognize that long-term care planning requires much more than an ini-
tial choice. Indeed, long-term care planning is actually comprised of a
set of fluid and lifelong consumer choices, each of which is highly sus-
ceptible to behavioral tendencies. By studying these levels of consumer
choice through a behavioral economics framework, policy-makers can
enrich current policies and improve our system of long-term care financ-
ing. A rigorous and comprehensive review of the current legal milieu is
necessary, since reliance on unsophisticated theoretical conceptions is a
dangerous dance with fire. Even one failed prediction can become the
final spark to the Medicaid powder keg.
215 See Hearing on Baby Boom Generation, supra note 35.
216 For examples, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 51, at 1123-24.
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